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Abstract 
We study the determinants of average pay across all levels of staff seniority for UK banks 
between 2003 and 2012. We show that pay is affected by agency problems but not by bank 
operating performance.  Average pay does not depend on accounting outcomes at the bank 
level.  By contrast, average pay is positively affected by the presence of a Remuneration 
Committee and the proportion of Non-Executives on the Board.  These findings indicate that 
bank pay is determined by agency issues, not bank accounting performance. Our results have 
practical implications for bank shareholders and regulators, suggesting the need for greater 
transparency in governance of bank pay. 
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The aim of this study is to directly compare different theories of what determines pay in banks. 
Two main theories apply to how pay is determined in firms, including in banks.  The first is that 
pay is determined by individual and firm performance, as a consequence of the Marginal 
Revenue Product of labour being one of the determinants of the demand curve for labour 
(Addison et al, 2014) and a result of incentive-setting mechanisms (Fama, 1980).  The second 
is that pay is determined as a consequence of agency problems: specifically that, because 
there are information asymmetries that advantage managers over shareholders, managers 
may be able to set pay unrelated to bank accounting performance (Carter et al, 2016).  It is 
possible that neither, one or both of these theories is correct. Bank pay could, for instance, be 
linked to bank accounting performance, but with deviations introduced by different levels of 
agency problems in different banks, such that both theories would have some explanatory 
power. 
In this paper, we seek to determine if either, or both, of these theories can be accepted in a 
specific empirical setting.  In particular, we analyse determinants of average pay in UK banks 
over a ten year period.  We focus on accounting measures of bank performance because 
these correspond to the operating level at which most staff act and are assessed.  In addition, 
we aim to include as many as possible of those entities which meet the economic definition of 
a bank.   
Our results show that agency issues have an effect on bank pay. Contrary, we do not find 
evidence that bank accounting performance affects pay. We find that specific governance 
structures have effects differing from what regulators intend, with a Remuneration Committee 
leading to higher remuneration (likely because its presence can be used to justify high pay) 
and bank-level operating outcomes failing to affect pay.   
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, this is the first empirical 
study to directly compare the relative explanatory power of these two theories of the 
determinants of bank pay.  Previous studies have considered the importance of specific drivers 
of pay, in the context of establishing specifications for empirical models, but they have not 
drawn these factors together into a comparative test of the power of the two theories, or shown 
that one theory is supported by evidence while the other is not. 
Second, our study considers a broader set of bank employees than any earlier research in 
this field.  Earlier studies of bank pay have addressed only the pay of the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) or, at most, of a few senior executives immediately under the CEO, and have 
ignored the pay of employees at lower levels.  Prominent examples include Srivastav and 
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Hagendorff (2015), Bai and Elyasiani (2013), Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011), Uhde (2015) 
and Efing et al (2015).  Ignoring lower levels is an important gap because focusing on a narrow 
sample in this way could obscure more general patterns.  Our paper addresses determinants 
of average pay across all levels of seniority in banks.   
 
2 Literature review and hypotheses 
Previous studies have argued that pay is determined by productivity and firm performance, 
sometimes alongside other causes. In basic microeconomics (e.g. Varian, 2014) pay is 
positively related to firm performance because of fundamental market mechanisms.  Of 
greater relevance to our work, Fama (1980) discusses the possibility that higher pay is 
awarded following higher performance because this constitutes an ex ante signal from 
shareholders that high performance will be rewarded in future.  As a matter of basic accounting 
(Atrill and McLaney, 2006) it is the case that higher bank accounting performance gives 
shareholders financial resources to pay more. 
Contrary to the theoretical predictions of the literature suggesting a pay-performance link, the 
literature in agency theory argues that managers have informational advantages over 
shareholders and therefore set their own pay without reference to performance.  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) theorised that the separation of ownership and control inherent in typical 
corporate structures may result in managerial decisions that deviate from shareholder value 
maximisation.  Carter et al. (2016) argue that the consequences of unresolved agency 
problems may include excessive pay awards, in which managers are able to exploit the 
separation of control from ownership to award themselves high pay, while taking advantage 
of information asymmetries to obscure the fact that this pay is not justified by performance. 
Vahey (2004) argues that the phenomenon of rent-sharing may be important in wage 
determination.   This occurs in situations where multiple groups of insiders form coalitions to 
more effectively extract rents from other parties.  One way in which this could manifest is that 
senior employees (who have power to determine wages) may form a coalition with less-senior 
employees (who lack such power) to more-effectively extract value from shareholders.  Most 
basically, less-senior employees may be paid enough to ensure that they do not ‘whistle-blow’ 
on excessive executive pay.  This suggests that average pay at all levels of seniority will be 
subject to similar agency problems to the most senior levels, given that executives may over-
pay less-senior staff as a means of securing alliances and their own high pay.  
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A range of studies identify diverse aspects that are expected to have effects on remuneration.  
We summarise below this literature to justify the choice of regressors in the empirical 
estimations.  
Brentiani (2004) points out that financial ratios which normalise performance to firm scale are 
important to shareholders.  Return on Assets (ROA), which normalises net income to total 
assets, is particularly important because it provides a robust measure of the effectiveness of 
assets in generating profit.  For this reason, we use ROA as a regressor in testing effects of 
bank accounting performance on average pay. 
One important consideration to take into account in how ROA is treated as an explanatory 
variable is downward nominal wage rigidity.  This is reported to be important at both the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic levels.  In New Keynesian models, downward nominal 
wage rigidity explains why wages do not drop rapidly to restore aggregate equilibrium after a 
negative output gap has arisen (Romer, 2006).  On a microeconomic level, Fehr and Goette 
(2005) show that downward nominal wage rigidity can exist regardless of the level of inflation 
and suggest that it arises because of the long-term nature of employment contracts, along 
with the behavioural heuristic of ‘money illusion’ (Wilkinson, 2008).  Radowski and Bonin 
(2010) provide further evidence that the phenomenon exists on a micro-economic level, 
though it is more frequent in manufacturing than in services.  
These studies imply we cannot expect a simple correlation between bank profitability and 
average pay.  There is evidence that bonuses are a larger component of pay at the most 
senior levels but are less important at other levels (Flabbi and Ichino, 2001) so increases in 
fixed base salary may be more important than bonuses in understanding the effects of bank 
accounting performance on average pay across the bank.  Given downward nominal wage 
rigidity, base salary may not move down after a year in which the bank has performed badly, 
but may move up after a year in which it has performed well (because banks have the financial 
ability to pay more and a desire to set incentives by rewarding desired outcomes).  So, as well 
as including simple measures of bank accounting performance, models of the determinants of 
average pay in banks should also contain measures of the positive component of bank 
accounting returns (calculated by setting returns to zero for observations where they were 
negative).  In addition, since pay contracts may take account of accounting performance over 
more than one year, and since accounting performance in the preceding year will determine 
wage increases that persist indefinitely (at least until employee turnover occurs) lagged effects 
should be taken into account. 
There are no studies which consider the effects of bank loan impairments on remuneration.  
However, on the basis of the literature discussed thus far, it is reasonable to hypothesise that 
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large impairments might lead to negative impacts on pay (or at least an absence of pay 
increases) as banks have less resources when impairments are large, and reason to dis-
incentivise behaviour that leads to impairments.  Indeed, regulation in the United Kingdom that 
has existed in some form since before the crisis of 2007-2009, requires that risk be taken into 
account in pay settlements (Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, Systems and Controls 
Sourcebook, Chapter 19).  So a measure of loan impairments, which is the most important 
metric of realised risk at the operating level for most banks, should be included in models of 
pay. 
An indicator which may serve as a proxy for the importance of agency problems in determining 
pay is the presence or absence of a Remuneration Committee.  This is because the way in 
which Remuneration Committees are composed may serve to exacerbate the effects of 
agency problems upon pay.  The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) (“the Code”) tasks 
Remuneration Committees with directly determining the pay of senior executives and setting 
policies and criteria for determining the pay of other staff.  The Code requires that 
Remuneration Committees ensure pay is ‘reasonable’, aligned with risk and not excessive.  
However, Renneboog and Zhao (2011) argue that inter-personal networks between Directors 
and CEOs at different firms may strongly affect corporate wage-setting.  This suggests that, 
although regulators view Remuneration Committees and oversight by Non-Executive 
Directors (NEDs) as means to restrict pay (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2014) it may 
actually be the case that these features of governance are used as justification for higher 
remuneration.  So the presence of a Remuneration Committee should be included as an 
explanatory variable in models of pay. 
It can also be expected that a higher proportion of NEDs on the Board leads to higher pay.  
This is because of the argument of Renneboog and Zhao (2011) that Remuneration 
Committee members permit higher pay, because they are part of the same social network as 
management.  If NEDs on the Remuneration Committee belong to such networks, then NEDs 
in general will also, and so will suffer from the same incentive distortions. 
There is also evidence that Executive Remuneration Disclosures may serve to mitigate agency 
problems and cause lower pay.  Specifically, Directors’ and senior managers’ desire to protect 
their future reputation may affect decisions they make in respect of remuneration.  For 
instance, there is evidence from Linet al. (2016) that Director reputation can be important in 
securing future business and, thus, that there is an incentive to act in ways that preserve 
reputation.  This suggests that pay awards will be lower in cases where they must be publicly 
disclosed, because Directors do not wish to become known for permitting managers and 
employees to take an excessive share of corporate income.  Because UK regulation 
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encourages banks to disclose executive remuneration, as a means to discourage excessive 
pay through public scrutiny and reputational risk, we have been able to use such disclosures 
as an empirical indicator. 
Finally, although there is no peer-reviewed evidence available, salary surveys conducted by 
recruitment firms (in particular the Robert Walters Salary Survey 2016) suggest that salaries 
are higher in certain parts of the banking sector, such as investment banks, and lower in other 
banks, such as mutuals.  This is unsurprising and suggests that indicators of bank business 
model should be included as controls in models of remuneration. 
Based on the above literature, we test the following hypotheses relating to the determinants 
of bank pay: 
H1: Average pay in banks is positively affected by bank accounting performance. 
H2: Average pay in banks is affected by proxies for the presence of agency problems. 
In summary, theoretical literature suggests that bank performance and / or agency problems 
may be important as determinants of bank pay.  Our work suggests that agency problems are 
important in determining pay in UK banks, but bank accounting performance is not.  This is 
the first time the two theories have been compared in this way. 
 
3 Method 
3.1 The Model 
We test whether measures of bank accounting performance and proxies for agency problems 
explain average pay in banks using cross-sectional and panel regression models.   
 
𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑆_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿. 𝑃𝑂𝑆_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐸𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐽𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
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𝛽14(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ∗ 𝐷𝑅)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝐷)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟏𝟔𝒀𝑹𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (2) 
where subscript i represents a bank while t represents a year.  The β terms are parameters to 
be estimated.  AP represents average pay, across all employees in the bank.  ROA represents 
return on assets.  POS_ROA represents the positive component of ROA and is included to 
allow for the possibility of downward nominal rigidity in the effect of accounting performance 
on wages, as explained above.  Both ROA and POS_ROA are included with a lag (denoted 
by “L”) to allow for the possibility that performance-related elements of wage contracts may 
reference accounting performance at time lags of greater than 12 months, as recommended 
by the UK financial services regulator (UK Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, Systems 
and Controls Sourcebook, Chapter 19).   
The variable LI represents loan impairments and is included because impairments are 
expected to have a negative effect on wages.  REMC represents the presence of a 
remuneration committee and is included because this is expected to have a positive effect on 
wages.  ERD represents the presence of executive remuneration disclosures and is expected 
to have negative effect on pay.  DR represents the director ratio (NEDs as a proportion of total 
Directors) and is expected to have a positive effect on pay, for the same reasons as a 
Remuneration Committee. 
JOINT represents the presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman and is included as a control to allow 
for the possibility that increasing the powers of the CEO will affect how pay is set.  MUT is a 
dummy variable representing mutual ownership, while SEC represents the proportion of 
assets that are listed securities (a proxy for investment banking activity).  The latter two are 
controls included to reflect the likelihood that ownership and business model affect pay.  YRD 
is a vector of year dummies for years 2004-2012 (with 2003 as a base year) and serves as a 
control for changing external conditions (legal, regulatory and economic) that are likely to 
affect pay.  
We also include interactions of bank size with director ratio and with executive remuneration 
disclosures, to accommodate the possibility that these have different effects in larger firms. 
Alongside these regressors, our models contain an idiosyncratic error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 reflecting 
variation from sources external to the model that can be treated as random and uncorrelated 
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with anything included in the model.1  Model (1) also contains a bank-specific error term 𝛼𝑖 to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant for banks through time.    
Models are estimated in linear form because linear functions are sufficient to test hypotheses 
while treating confounding factors as constant.  Model (2) is estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares while (1) uses the random effects estimator, which is suitable for the panel-model 
specification used in that equation.  This approach serves to show that results are robust to 
the choice of estimator.   
 
3.2 Data  
To test our hypotheses, data was extracted from Bankscope Bureau Van Dijik and combined 
with manually-sourced data on governance and ownership.   The data we employ relates to 
the United Kingdom and is at annual frequency, since quarterly data is severely incomplete.  
It spans years 2003 through 2012.  This period covers both a benign economic period (2003-
2007) and a crisis period (2008-2012).   
Our initial sample include data on 711 legal entities for the United Kingdom.  We remove firms 
that are not retail, commercial, corporate, investment or universal banks and ensure that only 
one entity per corporate group (the consolidated parent entity in all but two cases) is present 
in the data set.  This reduces the sample to 115 banks and total observations for these 115 
banks over the 10-year period numbered 762.  In the context of the UK, this represents the 
population at the time.2  The sample is an unbalanced panel due to de novo creation of new 
banks, mergers and bankruptcies, but the estimators used are robust to this. 
For each bank we manually collected data from annual reports and the Pillar 3 disclosures 
required under Basel 2 and 3 regulations.  The data collected in this way relate to ownership 
type, numbers of executive and non-executive directors, presence of a joint CEO-Chairman, 
presence of a Remuneration Committee and presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman.  The use of 
manually-collected data gives our research unique information not used in other studies.   
The data we use from Bankscope are on an annual, calendar-year basis, with variables 
presented with universal definitions across banks, based on the Fitch Universal format.  For 
                                               
1 Testing shown in Table 4 verifies that this assumption is justified. 
2 Where banks are established de novo and come into existence during a year, a record is included for 
them in our data for the year in which they come into existence.  Where banks cease to exist during a 
year due to failure, a record is also included for them for that year, but not for subsequent years.  Where 
banks cease to exist during a year due to merger or acquisition, no record is included for them for that 
year in order to avoid double-counting with the new group entity that is thereby created and which is 
also present in the data set. 
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banks that do not have a December year end, Bankscope includes data for the nearest bank 
year-end to the December year-end in showing annual data.  For our analysis, this detail is of 
limited importance as the great majority of the banks in our sample have a December year 
end for financial accounting purposes.3   
We record governance data collected from annual reports and Pillar 3 disclosures as the 
values that prevailed for most of the calendar year.  For instance, if a bank had 8 non-executive 
directors for most of the year but lost one of them three months before the calendar year-end, 
then we record the number of NEDs present for the year as 8.  This is possible because banks 
disclose arrival and departure dates for Directors during the year.  In this way, outcomes over 
the year are compared with the governance structure that prevailed for most of the year.   
In cases where a foreign parent has control over a UK branch or subsidiary, the composition 
of the foreign parent’s Board was used as the basis of the governance data we collected.  A 
separate UK Board was used only where the annual reports of the company state explicitly 
that it has decision-making independence from the parent.  This convention provides further 
support for the argument that governance variables are exogenous: if a characteristic 
originates with an overseas parent entity, it is less likely to be subject to reverse causality in 
which it is affected by financial characteristics of the branch or subsidiary. 
For a few continental European parent entities where there is both a supervisory Board and a 
managerial Board, we include the supervisory Board only in defining variables relating to 
Board composition.  This is because the supervisory Board has oversight over the managerial 
Board and can over-rule its decisions, while the managerial Board is more similar to an 
Executive Committee in a UK corporate governance context.   
Non-Executive Directors are defined in our data as Directors who do not have any executive 
responsibilities identified by the annual report.  In applying corporate governance codes and 
guidelines, banks may operate slightly different definitions of non-executive status, such as 
having no executive responsibilities and having had no such responsibilities with the same or 
a related organisation at any time in the past.  Since banks vary in their application of 
                                               
3 Those that did not mostly had year ends close to December.  Out of 111 entities for which we could 
obtain annual reports, 85 (77%) had year ends at the end of December and 106 (95%) had year ends 
between the end of September and the end of March.  In any case, since the external economic and 
regulatory conditions that are included in our models (captured through year dummies) tend to be very 
stable from one year to the next and the fundamental characteristics of banks themselves change 
slowly, a slight mismatch in the time points at which banks are compared would have minimal effect on 
the analysis.  
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definitions established in governance codes – such as in what counts as a ‘related 
organisation’ – adopting their definitions could lead to inconsistency in our data.  We therefore 
adopt the simpler, more objective standard of simply counting NEDs as directors who do not 
have specifically identified executive responsibilities.  By this definition, Chairmen and Vice / 
Deputy Chairmen of banks are classified as non-executive if they do not have specific 
identified executive responsibilities and instead serve mainly to oversee the CEO and other 
executives. 
Generating descriptive statistics confirmed that variables were suitable for inclusion in 
econometric models.  This revealed that means, standard deviations and outliers all had 
economically plausible values.   
Missing data was imputed by backward replacement in which a missing value was replaced 
with the value at the subsequent time point for the relevant variable and bank or, if this was 
not possible, replacement with the average value for the relevant variable across all 
observations.  This approach takes advantage of the autocorrelation present in the data.  
Importantly, no imputation was carried out for the dependent variable, thus avoiding a situation 
where imputation occurred on both sides of the comparison.   
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables used in our models are as follows, shown with definitions and descriptive statistics 
that verify their suitability for inclusion in models (Table 1). 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 shows a correlation matrix for explanatory variables, indicating no high 
multicollinearity. 





4.1 Main Results 
We find that no aspect of bank accounting performance has a robust effect on bank pay.  By 
contrast, aspects of governance have robust significant effects in a manner that suggests the 
importance of agency problems.  For instance, the presence of a Remuneration Committee 
leads to higher average pay, which may well be due to social network effects involving 
executives and NEDs in the manner discussed by Renneboog and Zhao (2011).  Table 3 
below shows our estimation results, with equations (1) and (2) being as stated in the Methods 
section above and equations (3) and (4) being similar to (2) albeit with regressors dropped for 
reasons of robustness testing. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In the above estimation results (Table 3), individual bank accounting performance does not 
have a significant effect on average pay, while several of the explanatory variables serving as 
proxies for the effects of agency problems are statistically significant, in a manner that is robust 
to model specification and estimation method, and have the expected sign. 
A simple measure of accounting returns has no effect on average pay, but neither does a 
measure that takes account only of positive components of returns while setting negative 
returns to zero – referred to as Positive ROA (POS_ROA).  This is contrary to the reasoning 
of Fehr and Goette (2005) that downward nominal wage rigidity arises because of the long-
term nature of employment contracts, along with behavioural heuristics in which employees 
individually and collectively resist downward wage movements, while readily accepting 
upward movements.   This is important because it is contrary to predictions of basic theory 
and assumptions that underpin regulation of bank governance. 
The finding that bank pay is insensitive to any measure of bank accounting performance also 
indicates that bonuses are not the main component of remuneration for most bank staff.  If 
they were, the effect of bonuses dropping when ROA performance is weak or negative, and 
rising when the opposite is true, would be expected to manifest as significant positive 
parameter values for both of the first two regressors in Table 3 above. 
It is also clear that higher loan impairments do not lead to lower average pay in the banks in 
our sample.  This suggests that, even when impairments are high, as they were for certain 
bank-year observations in our sample, the effects on average pay are negligible.  This 
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suggests that the linkage of pay to realised risk expected by regulators (Financial Conduct 
Authority Handbook, Systems and Controls Sourcebook, Chapter 19) is not widespread for 
employees in general in the banks in our sample.  So, although these are findings of no 
significant association, they nevertheless have interesting implications for regulation. 
Taking the above findings together, it is clear that hypothesis H1 cannot be accepted.  There 
is no statistically-significant evidence that bank accounting performance has an effect on 
average pay within banks. 
By contrast, indicators that serve as a proxy for the extent of agency problems do have a 
significant association with bank pay in our models.  Specifically, a Remuneration Committee 
and a higher NED ratio both have a positive effect on bank pay, as expected.  This is in 
accordance with the argument of Renneboog and Zhao (2011) that oversight structures can 
have effects on remuneration very different from what is envisaged in guidance such as the 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2014).  It is clear that overseers may collude in, or be used 
as justification for, higher pay.  This casts doubt on the view that internal controls within banks 
can be used to ensure reasonable and efficient remuneration. 
As summarised by Morris et al (2009) the dominant view of corporate remuneration in the UK 
and countries with similar economies has been that centralised regulation would introduce 
inefficiencies and that regulators, acting via the audit profession, should simply encourage 
independent oversight structures at the firm level, designed to ensure that pay awards are 
justified.  However, there have been critics such as Renneboog and Zhao (2011) who point 
out that the Directors and CEOs of different firms belong to connected interpersonal networks 
and this may introduce inefficiency.  The results we report here support the critics, rather than 
the established view. 
These results show that agency problems are important in determining pay within banks.  
Having a Remuneration Committee and a higher Director Ratio exacerbates agency problems 
relating to pay because it places control over remuneration in the hands of individuals who are 
part of the same social network as management (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011) and creates a 
means of appearing to justify high pay.   
Amongst control variables, we find that remuneration is higher in investment banks and lower 
in mutual banks, compared to other banks.  This is not surprising, but it is the first time it has 
been reported in a rigorous econometric study and it suggests that our model is working well.   
Coefficients on binary regressors can be interpreted as marginal effects; that is the number of 
thousands of pounds sterling (GBP) added to average pay by increasing the relevant 
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regressor by one unit.  Having a remuneration committee raises average pay by between 
£37,000 and £68,000.  Having a Board composed 75% of NEDs raises it by between £23,000 
and £38,000 compared to a bank with a Board composed 50% of NEDs.  These effects are 
large, but they occur in a sample where the average bank has average pay of £150,000 per 
annum and some banks pay much more.  They may be somewhat larger than intuition would 
suggest, but they are reliable in that they have been isolated by means of a well-controlled 
estimation strategy. 
It is important to consider the possibility that results might differ across bank type, or over time 
as structural conditions change.  In particular, mutual banks have different corporate 
objectives and incentive structures from shareholder-owned banks. The mutual objective 
involves a broader set of goals including the provision of high quality products and services, 
along with adequate profitability. It follows that profit maximisation is one of – and probably 
not the most important – business objective of these credit institutions. Thus managers at 
mutual banks have lower incentives to maximise profits and seek risk, either in the form of 
bonus schemes or substantial equity holdings in the bank.  In consequence, mutual banks 
tend to have lower risk and lower return than shareholder-owned banks (Schliefer and Vishny, 
1997). 
It is therefore possible that the effects of performance and governance upon remuneration are 
different in mutual banks compared to other banks. To test this possibility, we add to our 
models multiplicative interactions of mutuality with ROA, positive ROA, loan impairments, the 
presence of a Remuneration Committee and the Director ratio. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Our results remain robust in this analysis. The presence of a remuneration committee 
continues to have positive effects on pay.  Bank performance continues to have no robust 
effects.  The interaction terms themselves are not significant in most specifications.  Therefore, 
our results hold across different bank ownership types. 
In the same vein, it is possible that the effects (and non-effects) we measure may change 
through time.  In particular, the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 could have led to transient 
or permanent changes in the effects of our explanatory variables.  In the case of a transient 
effect, the phenomenon of ‘flight to safety’ in the financial sector is well-documented 
(Kontonikas et al, 2013) with returns of safe-haven assets turning negative in some cases 
(International Monetary Fund, 2016).  If a similar phenomenon of temporarily foregoing 
personal gain in order to remain safe occurs in rent-seeking behaviour, then effects of 
governance and bank performance on pay might change during a crisis period.   
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To test this possibility, we generate a during-financial-crisis indicator (FinCr) that takes a value 
1 in the years 2008 and 2009 (the most intense years of the global financial crisis) and a value 
zero in all other years.   
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
This analysis shows clearly that our results hold during the crisis years and non-crisis years 
equally.  The presence of a remuneration committee continues to have positive effects on pay.  
Bank performance continues to have no robust effects.  The interaction terms themselves are 
not significant.    
In the case of a possible permanent structural break, it is known that regulators began to 
immediately improve bank governance once the global financial crisis erupted, removing bank 
leaders seen as ineffective or corrupt from the moment banks were bailed out in 2008, and 
improving standards in the enforcement of governance codes and remuneration codes from 
that time and over the next several years (Masciandaro and Romelli, 2017).  It is possible that 
these supervisory and regulatory changes altered the way in which pay is determined in banks. 
To test this possibility, we generate a post-financial-crisis indicator (PFC) that takes a value 1 
for all years from 2008 onwards (reflecting the beginning of structural change at that point in 
time) and a value zero in earlier years.  We generate multiplicative interactions of this with 
ROA, positive ROA, loan impairments, the presence of a Remuneration Committee and the 
Director ratio.  
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
This analysis reveals that bank performance continues to lack any robust effects when we 
allow for the possibility of a structural break and that, in fully-controlled models with all controls 
included in the specification, the presence of a remuneration committee continues to lead to 
higher pay.  Results are robust to interactions with changing conditions over time, and to 
interactions with mutual ownership type. 
In summary, we can reject hypothesis H1.  There is, surprisingly, no evidence that financial 
outcomes at the bank level affect average pay within banks.  By contrast, hypothesis H2 
cannot be rejected.  We find that the presence of a Remuneration Committee and large 
numbers of NEDs lead to higher pay, which indicates that agency problems are important in 
determining bank pay.  This suggests bank shareholders and regulators need to adopt 
radically greater measurability and transparency in pay-setting mechanisms and possibly 





4.2 Robustness Testing 
This study deals effectively with a range of empirical issues that can arise in models.  Most 
fundamentally, parameter stability can be assumed because the basic institutions and 
corporate law of the United Kingdom did not change fundamentally over the period of study.  
Models are varied across specifications (1) to (4) in Table 3 as a means to show robustness 
to the set of explanatory variables included and to the choice of estimation method.  
Our estimations are robust to endogeneity.  Endogeneity due to error in measurement of 
regressors is unlikely since explanatory variables are precise categorical, count or financial 
terms that are measured accurately.  Endogeneity due to reverse causality or simultaneity is 
similarly unlikely because lagged regressors are used where relevant and explanatory 
variables relating to governance, ownership and business model are remarkably stable over 
time for individual banks.  Such features represent relatively fixed, constitutional choices made 
by banks, which do not generally change in response to variations in commercial outcomes, 
at least not over the time scales considered in this study.  This is evident in that explanatory 
variables relating to institutional features of banks were all found to have autocorrelation 
exceeding 0.86. 
Endogeneity due to omitted variables is possible in principle if there are factors that affect 
average pay which are not measured (perhaps because they are features of corporate culture 
that cannot be measured in any practical way) and which are correlated with our explanatory 
variables.  However, empirical testing using auxiliary regressions to test for correlation of 
residuals from estimations in column 3 and 4 (Table 3) with the regressors shows no evidence 
of endogeneity (Table 4 in Appendix A). 
This shows no evidence that regressors are correlated with residuals and, hence, no evidence 
of endogeneity.  We did not include powers of explanatory variables in the auxiliary regression 
as this serves to test for omitted nonlinearities, rather than endogeneity alone.  The same 
results as above (no significant association of residuals with any regressor) are found when 
we include all regressors in a one-equation auxiliary regression with idiosyncratic error terms 
from equation (3) as dependent variable (results not shown for reasons of space, can be 
provided upon request). 
Our models have Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) of 1-8 for the regressors of interest.  This 
indicates that multicollinearity has magnified coefficient standard errors by factors of 1 to 2.8.  
However, we do not remove regressors as the VIFs are not excessively high, there is no one 
obvious regressor to remove and we do not wish to unbalance our model specification 
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strategy.  In any case, it has clearly been possible to obtain significant results and we verify 
(using models with smaller numbers of regressors – not shown) that multicollinearity does not 
cause sign reversal.   
The testing to confirm this involved the four explanatory variables ROA, lagged ROA, the 
positive ROA and the lagged positive ROA being included individually in models (without the 
other three but with all other regressors).  This is important because these variables are 
intrinsically correlated with one another, such that they account for all VIFs greater than 2.3 
(standard error magnification of 1.5) in our analysis.  This testing still does not yield the 
expected association of any of the four regressors with average pay.  (It does produce some 
evidence of an association of L.ROA with pay, but this is not robust and has the opposite sign 
from what all theory and literature suggests.)  Our testing thus confirms that multicollinearity 
is not the reason the expected associations have not been detected for measures of bank 
accounting performance. 
   
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications  
We find no evidence that average bank pay depends on accounting outcomes at the bank 
level.  By contrast, indicators that serve as proxies for agency problems do matter as 
determinants of average pay.  The presence of a Remuneration Committee or of higher 
proportions of NEDs on the Board leads to higher average pay, likely because these structures 
are used to apparently justify high pay.   
This study has practical implications for bank shareholders and regulators.  In particular, it 
departs from the standard view as summarised in Morris et al (2009) that controls at the firm 
level can restrain pay and implies instead that Remuneration Committees, even if they are 
useful as tools of risk management, are counter-productive as tools of pay restraint.  If real 
justification of pay is to be an objective of policy, it must be achieved by other means. 
What might these other means be?  The essence of the problem is that, in the presence of 
information asymmetries, members of Remuneration Committees (and NEDs more generally) 
can be used to apparently justify pay decisions by managers because they have limited 
incentives to act otherwise.  One possible solution is to introduce centralised regulation of pay, 
such that incentive distortions at the firm level become irrelevant.  Another is to reduce the 
information asymmetry by linking pay more explicitly to measurable outcomes at the personal 
or firm level, with radically greater transparency for internal and external parties on how the 
process works.   
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Interesting theoretical work (Thanassoulis, 2012) has argued for centralised regulation of bank 
pay on different grounds (specifically that competition amongst banks for staff pushes up pay 
and thus increases the risk that banks will default, because capital is depleted).  Based on the 
evidence presented in our paper, it is clear that central regulation would lessen the incentive 
distortions involved in setting pay.  However, the phenomenon of pay-setters belonging to the 
same interpersonal networks as bank managers might not disappear entirely (in the case of 
regulatory capture) and the problem of information asymmetries could well be worse than for 
shareholders. 
Radically greater transparency in pay setting appears more promising, in that it would reduce 
problems of information asymmetry and would also be effective against distorted incentives, 
in that individuals are less likely to act on such incentives when there are substantial 
reputational costs.   
Transparency could be less effective in cases where managers have personal objectives that 
are intangible and hard to measure.  For instance, if a specific manager has a remit to ensure 
effective interpersonal communication across teams, how exactly could this be measured?  
Nevertheless, many tasks that are not currently measured could be made measurable by 
identifying Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that serve as a reasonable proxy for desired 
outcomes and by ensuring that someone other than the person affected verifies the 
measurement.  For instance, a human resources manager (a responsibility often considered 
intangible) could be remunerated based on KPIs relating to staff recruitment, turnover and 
retention and staff incidents, normalised to industry benchmarks.   
Improved transparency could also improve the effectiveness of centralised regulation, if one 
of the main vulnerabilities of such regulation is information asymmetry.  Regulation could 
likewise seek to ensure that disclosures do not seek to mislead, distort or omit. 
Thus, our recommendation to bank shareholders and regulators is to make the determination 
of bank pay much more measurable and transparent.  We also suggest that some form of 
centralised regulation should be considered (at least for important firms) in case pay-setters 
simply perceive no reputational cost of excessive pay awards or seek to distort disclosures.  
Regulation could include a rule that systemically important banks must justify to the regulator 
pay awards that breach thresholds pre-defined with respect to industry norms.   
In summary, bank pay is determined by agency problems, not accounting performance, 
implying a need for greater measurability and transparency in setting pay, and some 
centralised regulation.  
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Appendix A: Endogeneity testing 
 
The following table shows the results of bivariate auxiliary regressions conducted for reasons 
of endogeneity testing. 
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Table 1: Variables used and descriptive statistics.   
In this table we report the variables employed in the analysis, their definition and descriptive statistics. 
Outliers have been removed in regression analysis to avoid excessive impact on estimates, including 
three observations were average pay was less than £20,000 because the bank had existed for less 
than the full year that the observation relates to.  Year dummy parameters include effects of inflation; 
results do not change when an inflation-adjusted version of AP is used. 
Variable Symbol Definition Obs Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable        
Average Pay AP 
Total remuneration expenditure 





150 680 10 1011 
Performance        
Return on Assets ROA 
Net income over total assets, all 
multiplied by 100 
756 % 0.37 2.25 -33.48 23.93 
Positive Component of ROA POS_ROA 
Equals ROA if ROA>0, 0 
otherwise 
756 % 0.61 1.58 0 23.93 
Loan Impairments LI 
Loan impairment charge over 
total assets, all multiplied by 100 
645 % 0.63 1.9 -17.33 29.91 




Takes value 1 if a Remuneration 
Committee is present, 0 otherwise 




Takes value 1 if executive 
remuneration is disclosed, 0 
otherwise 
554 Binary 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Director Ratio DR 
Proportion of the Board who are 
Non-Executive Directors 
528 Ratio 0.72 0.14 0.27 1 
Joint CEO-Chairman JOINT 
Takes a value of 1 if the Board 
Chairman and CEO of the bank 
are the same individual, 0 
otherwise 
532 Binary 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Mutual Ownership MUT 
Takes a value of 1 if the bank is 
owned by depositors and / or 
employees, 0 otherwise 
760 Binary 0.4 0.49 0 1 
Other controls        
Securities Holdings SEC 
Total securities holdings over total 
assets 
730 Ratio 0.21 0.21 0 1 
Size Over GDP SIZE 
Total assets divided by UK 
nominal GDP for the same year 
760 Ratio 0.07 0.26 7.90E-05 2.05 
Rank by Assets RBA 
A ranking computed on the basis 
of total assets 
520 Rank 3282 2463 18 10152 
Year Dummies YRD 
Year dummies that take the value 
of 1 for each individual year 
between 2003 and 2012, zero 
otherwise 







Table 2 Pearson correlation matrix of explanatory variables. 
In this table we report the Pearson correltion coefficients for the main variables included in the analysis. 






























































































































LI 1                   
ROA -0.5 1                 
POS_ROA -0.22 0.64 1               
DR 0.22 -0.35 -0.07 1             
SEC 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.3 1           
SIZE 0.08 -0.07 -0.04 0.25 0.55 1         
MUT -0.47 0.02 -0.18 -0.4 -0.52 -0.45 1       
REMC 0.08 -0.09 0.01 -0.17 0.13 0.11 0.05 1     
ERD -0.12 0.1 -0.05 -0.32 -0.14 0.13 0.26 0.45 1   
JOINT 0.06 -0.2 0.19 0.28 -0.1 -0.08 -0.23 -0.05 -0.2 1 
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Table 3 Estimation results for models explaining average pay in banks. 
In this table we present the results from the estimation of Equation (1) and (2). The dependent variable 
is average pay in all estimations. Column (1) estimates from the random effect model (Equation 1); 
columns (2-4) estimates from the OLS model (Equation 2).  Diagnostic testing for heteroskedasticity 
using the Breusch-Pagan test shows it to be present, such that clustered standard errors are used.  
VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.21 to 7.47, but this has not prevented the detection of 
significant associations or caused sign reversals (determined using smaller sets of regressors).  
Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis 
that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large 
as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F is the 
probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of 
residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression 
coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of endogeneity; results not shown.)  
Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the probability of obtaining a test statistic at least as extreme as that obtained 
under the null hypothesis of spherical error variance. Clustered standard errors appear in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% two tailed level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ROA 8.810 -2.287 -7.986  
 (5.874) (14.65) (17.56)  
ROAt-1 -7.485 -18.67 -13.94  
 (5.451) (11.96) (11.81)  
POS_ROA -6.122 19.09 31.98 5.462 
 (7.656) (16.36) (34.41) (18.39) 
POS_ROAt-1 -13.66 -15.47 -39.13 -70.57** 
 (9.237) (18.25) (27.96) (32.51) 
LI 0.873 -9.775 -13.44 -7.052 
 (1.846) (6.517) (9.590) (5.386) 
REMC 37.14** 68.38*** 63.62** 55.47** 
 (17.84) (21.00) (26.14) (24.06) 
ERD -25.81 -41.16** -19.96 -18.06 
 (16.93) (17.39) (27.94) (31.48) 
DR 89.62** 90.11 229.6*  
 (44.00) (60.50) (117.4)  
JOINT 23.13 75.53**   
 (14.69) (35.77)   
MUT -98.48*** -70.30*** -98.55*** -110.5*** 
 (16.99) (16.38) (34.45) (41.69) 
SEC 235.3* 419.7*** 324.2*** 376.2*** 
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 (126.1) (90.50) (66.18) (82.23) 
SIZE -1,152*** -1,891 621.3*** 397.7** 
 (293.9) (1,383) (131.8) (181.6) 
WRA 1.60e-05 0.00702***   
 (0.00288) (0.00190)   
SIZE*DR 1,002*** 2,468 -323.0* -90.73 
 (388.3) (1,628) (168.4) (135.3) 
SIZE*ERD 161.2 147.3 -500.9*** -463.4*** 
 (146.9) (454.7) (92.84) (117.3) 
Constant 38.29 -52.12 -100.6 84.23*** 
 (31.82) (59.64) (88.54) (27.29) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 292 292 410 410 
R-squared 0.789 0.804 0.576 0.539 
VIFs 1.3 – 8.4 1.3 – 8.4 1.5 – 7.3 1.2 – 3.9 
F statistic  2241.4 102.6 117.8 
Pr > F  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Wald Chi2 1023.5    
Pr > Chi2 <0.001    
F (endo reg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 




Table 4 Estimation results including mutual ownership 
In this table we present the results from models that include interactions with mutual bank status. The 
dependent variable is average pay in all estimations. The table reports the results for the main effects 
and the interactions with mutual ownership. All specification include the same explanatory variables 
and controls included in Table 3. Clustered standard errors appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% two tailed level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ROA 10.21 -2.258 -7.124  
 (6.754) (16.1) (18.42)  
ROAt-1 -7.695 -18.15 -14  
 (5.644) (12.27) (11.98)  
Mutual_ROA -19.91 -18.18 -25.7 -27.36* 
 (16.92) (24.5) (25.03) (14.03) 
POS_ROA -7.241 11.64 24.57 -3.978 
 (8.612) (18.09) (33.58) (16.22) 
POS_ROAt-1 -12.7 -13.87 -36.35 -66.58** 
 (9.576) (19.62) (27.42) (30.6) 
Mutual_POS_ROA 24.79 51.09 72.48* 107.9** 
 (24.45) (35.75) (38.5) (43.8) 
LI 1.392 -10.32 -13.51 -7.737 
 (1.878) (7.164) (9.796) (5.751) 
Mutual_LI -11.97 5.832 -22.01 -10.79 
 (10.49) (14.39) (16.57) (12.8) 
REMC 37.03* 83.31*** 79.84** 71.25** 
 (18.95) (24.57) (34.47) (29.71) 
Mutual_REMC -6.447 -49.59* -65.75 -67.75 
 (19.91) (29.15) (45.16) (42.87) 
Constant 39.13 -59.11 -111.4 70.46*** 
  (31.66) (61.31) (99.33) (25.56) 
Agency variables YES YES YES YES 
Other controls YES YES YES YES 





Table 5 Estimation results, effects of the financial crisis 
In this table we present the results from models that include interactions with an indicator of financial 
crisis conditions. The dependent variable is average pay in all estimations. The table reports the results 
for the main effects and the interactions with a during-financial-crisis dummy (FinCr). All specifications 
include the same explanatory variables and controls included in Table 3. Clustered standard errors 
appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% two tailed 
level, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ROA 4.963 3.828 11.61  
 (7.068) (14.23) (15.24)  
ROAt-1 -7.744 -19.37* -17.23  
 (4.855) (11.19) (12.61)  
FinCr_ROA 2.373 -17.19 -25.74 -8.647 
 (11.68) (23.71) (18.8) (21.35) 
POS_ROA -3.065 7.129 6.415 0.936 
 (10.22) (20.96) (24.55) (17.98) 
POS_ROAt-1 -13.85 -6.987 -34.1 -68.20** 
 (9) (14.88) (24.17) (29.97) 
FinCr_POS_ROA -10.48 -9.865 24.84 7.675 
 (21.97) (40.24) (31.76) (36.37) 
LI -3.204 -18.83* -25.55 -27.72* 
 (5.459) (10.11) (15.78) (16.13) 
FinCr_LI 2.874 5.061 12.52 20.57 
 (5.704) (10.14) (11.1) (13.86) 
REMC 38.36** 69.56*** 67.22** 61.62** 
 (18.86) (20.13) (26.37) (24.76) 
FinCr_REMC 16.85 2.799 -6.857 -10.88 
 (12.12) (17.28) (22.29) (25.28) 
DR 76.89* 69.57 246.0*  
 (40.09) (57.92) (131.6)  
FinCr_DR 72.98 58.64 -84.76  
 (73.14) (57.92) (108.3)  
Constant 31.94 -32.29 -32 92.77** 
  (32.29) (56.4) (61.66) (42.54) 
Agency variables YES YES YES YES 
Other controls YES YES YES YES 








Table 6 Estimation results, effects of structural change 
In this table we present the results from models that include interactions with an indicator of structural 
change occurring after the global financial crisis. The dependent variable is average pay in all 
estimations. The table reports the results for the main effects and the interactions with a post-financial-
crisis dummy (PFC). All specifications include the same explanatory variables and controls included in 
Table 3. Clustered standard errors appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ROA 8.038 -14.23 -3.098  
 (26.69) (33.77) (27.55)  
ROAt-1 -9.207 -20.42 -16.34  
 (6.298) (12.30) (12.04)  
PFC_ROA 1.269 14.78 -10.67 -16.43 
 (26.43) (37.80) (35.87) (17.18) 
POS_ROA -13.10 7.735 -8.071 -14.75 
 (32.87) (44.55) (31.40) (15.25) 
POS_ROAt-1 -17.61 -14.76 -30.96 -65.88** 
 (11.76) (20.07) (25.71) (30.75) 
PFC_POS_ROA 10.31 28.52 69.10 53.63 
 (32.32) (52.55) (61.65) (37.40) 
LI 17.67 12.00 10.11 12.51 
 (19.45) (33.12) (21.07) (20.51) 
PFC_LI -17.36 -20.28 -26.72 -26.02 
 (19.63) (32.25) (18.38) (18.75) 
REMC 40.64** 57.91** 41.26 32.14 
 (19.45) (27.68) (25.52) (25.55) 
PFC_REMC 16.57 15.99 35.83 39.24 
 (13.64) (25.72) (27.84) (24.99) 
DR 125.8** 101.1 135.5**  
 (62.99) (88.88) (65.88)  
PFC_DR -35.22 -17.72 145.5  
 (43.39) (100.1) (143.6)  
Constant -6.994 -44.54 -162.7 53.34* 
  (49.99) (74.41) (111.3) (28.89) 
Agency variables YES YES YES YES 
Other controls YES YES YES YES 








Table 7 Empirical testing for endogeneity. 
This table presents the results of the test for endogeneity. Note that this is a set of regressions with one 
explanatory variable and no intercept, such that it is equivalent to a Pearson correlation. The dependent 
variable is the idiosyncratic error term from equation (3) in Table 3 and is stated at the top of columns. 
Explanatory variables are in rows. Equations are estimated using OLS. Estimated parameter values 
are shown with star symbols for statistical significance. Classical standard errors are in parentheses. 
These are not adjusted for heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, so as to maximise the chances of 
detecting endogeneity.  Equivalent results (no evidence of endogeneity) are obtained when all of the 
regressors are put in one equation with the idiosyncratic error term as the dependent variable. Standard 
errors appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% two 
tailed level, respectively. 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
              
ROA -7.23e-
08 
            
 (2.959)             
L.ROA  -1.59e-
07 
           
  (3.96)            
POS_ROA   -4.23e-
08 
          
   (6.794)           
L. POS_ROA    -1.65e-
07 
         
    (6.526)          
LI     -6.78e-
09 
        
     (1.417)         
REMC      1.89e-
08 
       
      (3.436)        
ERD       1.54e-
08 
      
       (4.234)       
DR        1.09e-
08 
     
        (4.321)      
JOINT         -9.54e-
07 
    
         (17.25)     
MUT          3.58e-
09 
   
          (4.03)    





           (13.62)   
SIZE            -7.40e-
07 
 
            (38.79)  
WRA             0 
             (0.001) 
Observations 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
   
 
